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I. INTRODUCTION
After the 9/11 attacks, Congress passed the USA Patriot Act, which included
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Security Act of 1978 (FISA).1 These
amendments ultimately facilitated mass Internet surveillance by the U.S.
National Security Agency (NSA).2 FISA was a statute designed to place limits
on U.S. foreign intelligence activities after abuses during the Cold War and
Vietnam War, including covert assassinations of foreign political leaders by the
CIA. 3
It is not surprising then, that after government contractor Edward Snowden
disclosed classified documents that exposed the scope of the NSA's Internet
surveillance, civil liberties and other groups filed civil claims that ultimately
reached the U.S. Supreme Court.4 What is perhaps surprising is that the Court's
Professor of Law, Seton Hall University Law School, and Director, Gibbons Institute of Law,
Science & Technology.
1. U.S. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001); David W.
Opderbeck, Cybersecurity and Executive Power, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 795, 822-26 (2012)
(citations omitted).
2. See Opderbeck, supra note 1, at 826.
3. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1885(c) (2012); Opderbeck, supra note 1, at 809-10 (citing
S.413, 112th Cong. § 249 (a)(6)(c)-(d)).
4. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
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decision in that case has become one of the hottest flashpoints in legal battles
over liability for consumer data breaches.
Data breaches are an enormous economic problem, costing the U.S.
economy billions, if not trillions, of dollars each year.5 Most of the data breach
litigation reported to date has arisen in the wake of large scale retail breaches,
such as those involving Target and Home Depot.6 The hackers in such cases are
after the credit card data that is read at the point of sale from the magnetic strips
or computer chips on consumer credit cards. This data usually is packaged and
sold on the dark web to other criminals who use it to make fraudulent purchases
of goods and services that either are consumed directly or, more often, are fenced
through online retail and auction websites.
Consumer credit card networks are structured through a web of contractual
relationships involving at least five parties: (1) the card brand (Visa, MasterCard,
American Express, or Discover); (2) the cardholder; (3) an issuing bank, which
issues the card to the cardholder; (4) the merchant; and (5) an acquiring bank,
which processes the merchant's card transactions.9 The card brand issues an
extensive set of regulations that govern the scope of these contractual
relationships.'0 Among those regulations is a "zero liability" policy through
which the issuing bank must agree to reimburse cardholders for any fraudulent
charges." Therefore, any charges to a cardholder's account resulting from a
retail data breach will be reimbursed by the issuing bank.12 Depending on the
circumstances of the breach, the issuing bank may then pursue indemnification
claims against the merchant of the acquiring bank under the card network
agreement. 13
5. See David W. Opderbeck, Cybersecurity, Data Breaches, and the Economic Loss
Doctrine in the Payment Card Industry, 75 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (citing Juniper
Research, Cybercrime and the Internet of Threats (May 2015),
https://www.juniperresearch.com/document-library/white-papers/cybercrime-the-internet-of-threats
[hereinafter Data Breaches]).
6. For a discussion of the Target breach, see Data Breach FAQ, TARGET,
https://corporate.target.com/about/shopping-experience/payment-card-issue-faq (last visited Mar.
16, 2016). For a discussion of the Home Depot breach, see Robin Sidel, Home Depot's 56 Million
Card Breach Bigger than Target's, WALL STREET J. (Sept. 18, 2014),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/home-depot-breach-bigger-than-targets- 1411073571.
7. See, e.g., Data Security, NATIONAL RETAIL FEDERATION, https://nrf.com/
advocacy/policy-agenda/data-security (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
8. See Stolen Target Cards and the Black Market: How the Digital Underground Works,
TRIPWIRE (Dec. 21, 2013), http://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/vulnerability-
management/how-stolen-target-credit-cards-are-used-on-the-black-market/.
9. See Data Breaches, supra, note 5.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. (citing VISA CORE RULES AND VISA PRODUCT AND SERVICE RULES, VISA
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Since card holders are fully reimbursed for fraudulent charges, claims by
card holders against the party directly responsible for the breach face challenge
on Article III standing grounds.14 This is where the Supreme Court's decision
resulting from the Snowden disclosures comes into play.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF CLAPPER IN CONSUMER CREDIT CARD BREACH CASES
A. The Clapper Decision
The standing analysis in recent data breach cases has focused on the
requirements for Article III standing discussed in the Supreme Court's Clapper
v. Amnesty International opinion.5  Clapper involved a challenge to the
National Security Agency's bulk metadata collection program under FISA.16
The plaintiffs, including a number of attorneys and human rights, labor, legal,
and media organizations, alleged that the NSA surveillance program violated
their constitutional and civil rights.'7  None of the plaintiffs, however, could
prove that the NSA had collected information about any of their specific
conversations, because the details of what was collected were classified.'8
Instead, the plaintiffs suggested that the possibility or likelihood that they could
be subject to surveillance had a chilling effect on their ability to "locate
witnesses, cultivate sources, obtain information, and communicate confidential
information to their clients."19
In a 5-4 opinion written by Justice Alito, the Court held that the plaintiffs
lacked standing to challenge the NSA surveillance program.20 According to the
Court, "[t]o establish Article III standing, an injury must be 'concrete,
particularized, and actual or imminent; fairly traceable to the challenged action;
and redressable by a favorable ruling."' 21 To be imminent, the Court noted, the
"threatened injury must by certainly impending" and "[a]llegations of possible
22
future injury" are insufficient. Justice Alito also noted the particular separation
of powers concerns arising from judicial review of Executive branch decisions
about intelligence gathering and foreign affairs.23
14. Id. (citing Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1155 (2013)).
15. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1146-55.
16. See id. at 1144.
17. Id. at 1145-46.
18. Id. at 1148-49.
19. Id. at 1145.
20. Id. at 1142, 1155.
21. Id. at 1147 (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)).
22. Id. (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990)) (emphasis in original).
23. Id. at 1146 (citing Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 555 U.S. 488, 493 (2009));
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341-342 (2006); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 at
818-820 (1997); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471-474 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418
U.S. 208, 221-222 (1974)).
2016] 601
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The Court held that the plaintiffs' claimed harms were not immanent
because the claims rested on a
highly speculative fear that (1) the Government will decide to
target the communications of non-U.S. persons with whom they
communicate; (2) in doing so, the Government will choose to
invoke its authority under [the FISA statute] rather than
utilizing another method of surveillance; (3) the Article III
judges who serve on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court will conclude that the Government's proposed
surveillance procedures satisfy [the FISA statute's] many
safeguards and are consistent with the Fourth Amendment; (4)
the Government will succeed in intercepting the
communications of respondents' contacts; and (5) respondents
will be parties to the particular communications that the
Government intercepts .24
The plaintiffs also claimed that they were compelled to take "costly and
burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of their communications" in
25light of the possibility of NSA surveillance. The Second Circuit had held that
these kinds of costs could support Article III standing so long as the feared harm
was not "fanciful, paranoid, or otherwise unreasonable."26 Justice Alito stated
that this standard "improperly waters down the fundamental requirements of
Article III.",27 According to Justice Alito, "respondents cannot manufacture
standing merely by inflicting harm on themselves based on their fears of
hypothetical future harm that is not certainly impending."2 8 Otherwise, Justice
Alito suggested, "an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure a lower
standard for Article III standing simply by making an expenditure based on a
nonparanoid fear."29 Therefore, the Court held that the plaintiffs lacked Article
III standing.30
Justice Breyer wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Sotomayor and Kagan.31 Based on the evidence provided by the plaintiffs about
their work and the history of the NSA surveillance program, Justice Breyer was
convinced there was "a very high likelihood" that the government would
32intercept some of plaintiffs' communications. Justice Breyer further argued
that the phrase "certainly impending" used by the majority was used more
flexibly in the Court's prior precedents.33  "Taken together," Justice Breyer
24. Id. at 1148.
25. Id. at 1151.




30. Id. at 1155.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 1157.
33. Id. at 1160-61.
602 [VOL. 67:599
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stated, "the case law uses the word 'certainly' as if it emphasizes, rather than
literally defines, the immediately following term 'impending."34 In particular,
according to Justice Breyer, "probabilistic" injuries have often sufficed to confer
standing.35 This must be the case, Justice Breyer argued-"[h]ow could the law
be otherwise?" because many claims seeking injunctive or other immediate
relief necessarily are based on less than 100 percent certainty.36
B. Clapper in the Retail Credit Card Data Breach Setting
The holding and majority opinion in Clapper have been invoked by district
courts in a number of recent prominent data breach cases to deny Article III
standing to consumer cardholders and other plaintiffs. These include litigation
arising from data breaches involving Michael's Stores, SuperValu supermarkets,
Advocate Health (an Illinois-based hospital-physician network), Zappos.com,
eBay, Paytime (a payroll service provider), Nationwide Mutual Insurance
Company, and Trustwave Holdings (a data security company).3 7
The Super Value case is typical of this group of cases in its evaluation of
potential harm from a data breach.38 The plaintiffs claimed that, even if their
credit card information had not been misused, there was a substantial likelihood
of misuse in the future. According to the Super Value court, this harm is
speculative because it is unclear whether the hacker "(1) read, copied, and
understood [Plaintiffs'] personal information; (2) intends to commit future
criminal acts by misusing the information; and (3) is able to use such
information to the detriment of [Plaintiffs] by making unauthorized transactions
in [Plaintiffs'] names."39 This litany of uncertainties obviously was designed to
parallel Justice Alito's skeptical list of events that would need to ensue for the
Clapper plaintiffs to suffer any concrete harm.40
Not all courts, however, have reached the same conclusion. Courts
addressing claims arising from data breaches involving Adobe, Uber, Sony, and
34. Id. at 1161.
35. Id. at 1162.
36. Id.
37. See Whalen v. Michael's Stores, No. 14-CV-70006(JS)(ARL), 2015 WL 9462108
(E.D.N.Y 2015); In re: SuperValue, Inc. Customer Data Security Breach Litigation, No. 14-MD-
2586(ADM/TNL), 2016 WL 81792 (D. Minn. 2016); Maglio v. Advocate Health and Hospitals
Corp., 40 N.E.3d 746 (Ill. App. 2d Dist. 2015); In re: Zappos.com, Inc., 108 F. Supp.3d 949 (D.
Nev. 2015); Green v. eBay, Inc., No. 14-1688, 2015 WL 2066531 (E.D. La. 2015); Storm v.
Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp.3d 359 (M.D. Pa. 2015); Galeria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., 998 F.
Supp.2d 646 (S.D. Ohio 2014); Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp.3d 871 (N.D. Ill.
2014). It should be noted that Strautins likely would have been decided differently after the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, 794 F.3d 688 (7th Cir.
2015). See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
38. See In re: Super Value, 2016 WL 81792, at *1.
39. Id. at *5 (quoting Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011)).
40. Cf Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1147-49.
2016] 603
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Neiman Marcus have found sufficient grounds for standing despite Clapper. 41
Most notably, the Seventh Circuit-the only federal appellate court to decide the
issue of standing in a date breach case after Clapper-refused to dismiss a
plaintiffs' putative class action in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group on standing
grounds .42
The plaintiffs in Remijas, like plaintiffs in many other data breach cases,
claimed damages including
1) lost time and money resolving the fraudulent charges, 2) lost time and
money protecting themselves against future identity theft, 3) the
financial loss of buying items at Neiman Marcus that they would not
have purchased had they known of the store's careless approach to
cybersecurity, and 4) lost control over the value of their personal
information.4
The Seventh Circuit concluded that plaintiffs whose credit card information
was improperly used as a result of the breach suffered ascertainable damages,
even though the card issuer reimbursed the charges and Neiman Marcus
provided free credit monitoring insurance, noting that "there are identifiable
costs associated with the process of sorting things out." 44 As to plaintiffs whose
information had not yet been misused, the court concluded that "Clapper does
not, as the district court thought, foreclose any use whatsoever of future injuries
to support Article III standing."45 According to the Seventh Circuit, Clapper
was decided under the same "substantial risk" standard that has always governed
46standing in claims for possible future harms.
The Seventh Circuit had little trouble finding standing for the Remijas
plaintiffs under that substantial risk standard because the hackers clearly
intended to use the stolen information to make fraudulent purchases.47 As the
court asked rhetorically, "[w]hy else would hackers break into a store's database
and steal consumers' private information? Presumably, the purpose of the hack
is, sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers'
41. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig. 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1213 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (stating
that "Clapper did not change the law governing Article III standing. The Supreme Court did not
overrule any precedent, nor did it reformulate the familiar standing requirements of injury-in-fact,
causation, and redressability."); Antman v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 3:15-CV-01 175-LB, 2015 WL
6123054, at *10 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (stating that "[t]he court thinks that a credible threat of immediate
identity theft based on stolen data is sufficiently different than the speculative harm articulated in
Clapper"); Corona v. Sony Pictures Entertainment, Inc., 2015 WL 3916744, *3 (C.D. Cal. 2015);
Remijas 794 F.3d 688, 690.
42. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 692-96.
43. Id. at 692.
44. Id.
45. Id.
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identities."4 8  Concerning mitigation expenses, such as extra identity theft
monitoring insurance purchased by some plaintiffs, the court noted that Neiman
Marcus' offer of one year of free credit monitoring was "telling" and that it was
"unlikely that it did so because the risk is so ephemeral that it can safely be
disregarded."49
The court found "dubious" plaintiffs' other damage claims asserting that
plaintiffs would not have shopped at Neiman Marcus had they known of the
store's lax security policies, but held the credit remediation and monitoring
claims were sufficient to survive dismissal based on standing.50 Finally, the
court concluded that plaintiffs had sufficiently demonstrated causation between
the Neiman Marcus breach and the claimed harms and that the claims for costs
associated with repairing and monitoring credit were redressable even if
fraudulent charges themselves were reimbursed by the issuing banks.
C. Clapper and the Internet of Things
The Internet of Things (loT) refers to physical devices that are connected to
52
the Internet, aside from desktop computers, laptops, tablets, or smart phones.
While the loT offers great promise in fields as diverse as healthcare,
transportation, consumer products, and even food, it opens vast new potential for
malicious hacking.53 There have been very few cases arising from hacking of
loT devices, but one recent case suggests that Clapper will present hurdles in
that domain as well as in consumer credit card cases.
In Cahen v. Toyota, plaintiffs filed a putative class action in the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of California against Toyota, Ford, and General
Motors, alleging that electronic control units in cars made by these
manufacturers can be remotely hacked.54 Plaintiffs claim that software that
allows various control units to communicate with each other can be accessed
through Bluetooth connections that enable consumers to link their cell phones
with the cars. The plaintiffs' Complaint refers to a journalist's report in a
popular media outlet about a test hack of one of the vehicles in 2011: "As I drove
48. Id.
49. Id. at 694.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 696-97.
52. See, e.g., Smart Products, Smart Makers, THE ECONOMIST (November 21, 2015),
http://www.economist.com/news/business-and-fmance/21678748-old-form-capitalism-based-built-
obsolescence-giving-way-new-one-which (discussing how "mundane things [such] as fizzy drinks
and washing powder" are becoming "smart").
53. See, e.g., The Internet of Things (To Be Hacked), THE ECONOMIST (July 12, 2014),
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21606829-hooking-up-gadgets-web-promises-huge-
benefits-security-must-not-be (discussing how greater connectivity "gives malicious hackers an
easy way to burrow deeper into people's lives").
54. Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corp., F.3d, 2015 WL 7566806, * 1 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
5 5. Id. at * 1.
2016] 605
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to the top of the parking lot ramp, the car's engine suddenly shut off, and I started
to roll backward . . . This wasn't some glitch triggered by a defective ignition
switch, but rather an orchestrated attack performed wirelessly, from the other
side of the parking lot, by a security researcher."56 The plaintiffs did not allege,
however, that any of their own vehicles had been hacked. The court found
these circumstances analogous to "product liability cases where there has been
no actual injury and the injury in fact theory rests only on an unproven risk of
future harm" and dismissed the claims for lack of standing under Clapper and
related authority.
III. CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD
The pace of data breach litigation filings shows no signs of abating.59 A
recent docket search limited to December 2015 through February 2016 revealed
putative consumer class actions filed in federal courts around the U.S. arising
from data breaches involving Experian (a financial credit reporting company),
Scottrade (an online stock broker), Ashley Madison (an adult dating site), Hyatt
Hotels, Lime Crime (a makeup retailer), Wendy's (a restaurant chain), and
Web.com (a third party web design and hosting company).60 Retailers and other
companies that hold customer data can continue to expect consumer class action
56. Id. at *2 (quoting Plaintiffs' First Amended Complaint). Although it is not clear from the
court's opinion, the reference seems to refer to a 2014 article and video on the computer and hacker
Website "Motherboard." See Xavier Aaronson, We Drove a Car While it Was Being Hacked,
MOTHERBOARD (May 29, 2014, 1:05 PM) http://motherboard.vice.com/read/we-drove-a-car-while-
it-was-being-hacked.
57. Cahen, F.3d, 2015 WL 7566806, at *1.
58. Id. at *10. The court also relied on U.S. Resort and Hotel Management, Inc. v. Onity,
Inc., 2014 WL 3748639, *1 (D. Minn. 2014), which involved an electronic door locking system that
was susceptible to hacking using a physical device that could read the code in the lock's memory.
Onity is not an loT case because there was no allegation that the locks were Internet-enabled and
accessible to remote hackers. Nevertheless, Onity is another example of a "hacking" case
concerning physical computer embedded-devices in which a court found a lack of standing absent a
showing of actual injury.
59. See, e.g., The Internet of Things (To Be Hacked), supra note 53 (discussing how in 2013
"more than 800m digital records, such as credit- and debit-card details, were pinched or lost, more
than three times as many" the year before and an increase in connectivity over the years will give
hackers "an easy way to burrow deeper into people's lives").
60. Pierpont v. Experian Information Solutions, No. 8:15-CV-01965 (C.D. Cal.), Complaint
filed November 24, 2015 (multiple consolidated cases); Martin v. Scottrade, No. 8:15-CV-02791
(E.D. Mo.), Complaint filed December 4, 2015 in M.D. Fla., transferred to E.D. Mo.; Lee v. Avid
Life Media (Ashley Madison), No. 2:15-CV-09475 (C.D. Cal.), Complaint filed December 8, 2015;
Affinity Gaming v. Trustwave Holdings, No. 2:15-CV-02464 (D. Nev.), Complaint filed December
24, 2015; Taylor v. Hyatt Hotels, No. 1:16-CV-00702 (N.D. Ill.), Complaint filed January 18, 2016;
Koenig v. Lime Crime, Inc., No. 2:16-CV-00503 (C.D. Cal.), Complaint filed January 21, 2016;
Torres v. The Wendy's Company, No. 6:16-cv-210-Orl-18DAB (M.D. Fla.), Complaint filed
February 8, 2016; Mohorne v. Web.com Group, Inc., No. 5:16-cv-00190 (C.D. Cal.), Complaint
filed February 2, 2016;
606 [VOL. 67:599
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litigation after notifying customers of breaches under state law.61 Although
many of these cases likely will be dismissed by trial courts for lack of Article III
standing under Clapper, other courts may apply the Seventh Circuit's Remijas
analysis and allow some claims to proceed. As a result, it is likely that other
circuit courts of appeal will decide the issue of standing in the credit card breach
context. While this could conceivably result in a circuit split, it seems unlikely
that the Supreme Court would take another Article III standing case in this area,
particularly when the commercial interests involved can manage the risks
through contracts and insurance.
Between Super Value and RemiUas, on the question of whether future misuse
of credit card information is likely, the Remijas analysis clearly makes more
sense. Hackers steal credit card information to use it and profit from it, and if
they know how to steal it, they know how to use it. This is a far cry from the
claims in Clapper, which involved possible government surveillance or use of
stored metadata that had not yet taken place and that would likely require some
kind of judicial authorization or action under and existing FISA court order.
Nevertheless, a more fundamental question raised by Justice Alito in Clapper-
that of the separation of powers-still lurks beneath the surface of all mass
consumer data breach cases. The question is whether a "mass tort" litigation
model is an effective way to manage the systemic risks of data breaches or
whether the legislative branch should act.
In addition to consumer litigation, large scale consumer data breaches likely
will continue to provoke disputes among the commercial parties in the consumer
credit chain: the issuing and acquiring banks, the merchant, and the card issuer.
Some of these disputes have already resulted in settlement agreements.6 2 The
role of cyber risk insurance in both commercial and consumer data breach
63compliance, disputes and settlements remains at an early stage.
The rapid growth of the loT also will certainly foster additional waves of
litigation as large scale breaches of connected consumer devices are discovered
and reported. The unique circumstances of the consumer credit card industry, in
which consumers are always reimbursed for fraudulent charges because of the
issuing bank agreements and the risks are spread among various commercial
parties by contract, do not usually obtain in most of the loT world. The loT
context often is much more akin to more familiar product liability and consumer
warranty settings. Courts will continue to grapple with the question raised in
61. Most states require individual notification to consumers after discovery of a data breach.
See Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx (last visited Jan. 4, 2016).
62. See "Target Reaches Another Data Breach Settlement," WALL STREET J. (December 2,
2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/target-reaches-another-data-breach-settlement-i1449085790;
Tracy Kitten, Will Banks Reject Home Depot Settlement, BANKINFO SECURITY (December 7, 2015),
http://www.bankinfosecurity.com/home-depot-a-8729/op- 1.
63. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, Cybersecurity (Jan. 25,
2016), http://www.naic.org/cipr topics/topiccyberrisk.htm; Data Breaches, supra note 5.
2016] 607
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Cahen: whether a civil claim for damages is only cognizable after someone is
actually injured or killed. The loT may stretch our usual understanding of the
boundaries between contracts (warranties and limitations of liability) and torts
(negligence and product liability), often expressed in terms of the economic loss
64doctrine, beyond the breaking point. Since a large scale legislative framework
does not seem politically likely, these issues are certain to occupy a significant
portion of court dockets for years to come.
64. Cf Data Breaches, supra note 5.
608 [VOL. 67:599
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